

Greek Occupation of Western Anatolia according to Archival Documents

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ABSTRACT

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This article analyzes Greece's military and diplomatic moves during the occupation of Anatolia within the scope of archival documents. The activities of the Greek army in Anatolia are evaluated in light of Ottoman, League of Nations, Greek, British, and American archival documents. Thus, through various archival documents, different aspects of the Greek occupation are revealed. The process, which started with the Greek invasion of İzmir on 15 May 1919, progressed gradually. During the military operations carried out by Greek troops into the interior of Anatolia, many innocent civilians lost their lives. The main objective of the Greek army, as stated in archival documents, was to destroy the Turkish identity in Anatolia. As reactions against the Greek occupation increased, the international community could not remain unresponsive to the issue. Investigation delegations sent to Anatolia revealed the massacres committed by Greek soldiers. Considering these developments, the Greek authorities established investigative committees within the army in order to avoid the reaction of

international public opinion. Numerous civil initiatives from Anatolia sent petitions to international organizations in order to publicize the massacres to the world. These petitions clearly revealed that Greece was committing massacres in Anatolia. The occupation continued at full speed, and the massacres in the occupied settlements continued unabated. The prolonged occupation of Anatolia led the Allied powers to question Greece. Thanks to the archival documents, it is seen that the Allied powers had different opinions about Greece and even subjected Greece to heavy criticism. When Greece began to lose the war, the Greeks in Anatolia also started to flee from the army, indicating that the occupation had suffered great defeat. The process, which started with Greece's diplomacy at the Paris Peace Conference before the war, continued with military and political attempts during the war. However, by 1922, it was realised that Greece was defeated against the Anatolian movement.

Keywords: Greek Occupation, İzmir, Western Anatolia, Massacres, Archival Documents.

ÖZ

DİNÇEL, Yusuf, **Arşiv Belgelerine Göre Yunanistan'ın Batı Anadolu İşgali**, CTAD, Yıl 19, Sayı 39 (Güz 2023), s. 1195-1229.

Bu makalede, Yunanistan'ın Anadolu işgali sırasındaki askerî ve diplomatik hamleleri, arşiv belgeleri kapsamında incelenmektedir. Yunan ordusunun Anadolu'daki faaliyetleri, Osmanlı, Milletler Cemiyeti, Yunan, İngiliz ve Amerikan Arşiv belgeleri ışığında değerlendirilmektedir. Böylece, çeşitli arşiv belgeleri sayesinde, Yunan işgalinin farklı yönleri ortaya çıkarılmaya çalışılmıştır. Yunanistan'ın, 15 Mayıs 1919'da İzmir'i işgaliyle başlayan süreç, aşama kaydederek ilerlemiştir. Yunan birlikleri tarafından Anadolu'nun içlerine doğru yapılan askerî operasyonlar sırasında, çok sayıda masum sivil hayatını kaybetmiştir. Yunan ordusunun temel hedefi, arşiv belgelerinde de belirtildiği üzere, Anadolu'daki Türk kimliğini yok etmektir. Yunan işgaline karşı, tepkilerin artmasıyla, uluslararası kamuoyu konuya tepkisiz kalamamıştır. Anadolu'ya gönderilen tetkik heyetleri, Yunan askerlerinin katliamlarını ortaya çıkarmışlardır. Yaşanan gelişmeler karşısında Yunan yetkililer, uluslararası kamuoyunun tepkisinden kaçınmak için ordu içerisinde göstermelik soruşturma heyetleri ihdas etmişlerdir. Anadolu'dan çok sayıdaki sivil inisiyatif, katliamları dünyaya duyurmak için uluslararası kurumlara dilekçeler göndermişlerdir. Bu dilekçelerde, açık bir şekilde Yunanistan'ın Anadolu'da katliam yaptığı gözler önüne serilmiştir. İşgal, bütün hızıyla devam etmiş ve işgalin edilen yerleşim yerlerindeki katliamlar da hız kesmeden sürmüştür. Anadolu işgalinin uzun sürmesi, İtilaf devletlerini Yunanistan'ı sorgulamaya yöneltmiştir. Arşiv belgeleri sayesinde,

İtilaf devletlerinin Yunanistan hakkında farklı görüşleri olduğu ve hatta Yunanistan'ı ağır eleştirilere maruz bıraktıkları görülmektedir. Yunanistan savaşı kaybetmeye başladığında, Anadolu'daki Rumların da askerden kaçmaya başlamaları, işgalin büyük hezime uğradığını göstermektedir. Yunanistan'ın savaş öncesinde Paris Barış Konferansı'nda yürüttüğü diplomasi ile başlayan süreç, savaş sırasındaki askeri ve politik hamlelerle devam etmiştir. Ancak 1922 yılına gelindiğinde Yunanistan'ın, Anadolu hareketi karşısında hezime uğradığı görülmüştür.

Anahtar Kelimeler: Yunan İşgali, İzmir, Batı Anadolu, Katliamlar, Arşiv Belgeleri.

Introduction

The adventure of Greece's occupation of Western Anatolia, which started with the occupation of İzmir on 15 May 1919, ended with the recapture of İzmir on 9 September 1922. The activities of Greece in Western Anatolia have been widely discussed in the literature in terms of military and political aspects, and there is a great deal of research on the subject. However, analyzing this period through archival documents offers an opportunity to examine in depth what happened during the Greek occupation of Western Anatolia. Greek and Western authorities engaged in many diplomatic correspondences both during the preparation for and during the war. By analyzing these documents, it is aimed to reveal the events that have remained hidden in history.

Complete and proper preparations before a military operation are of great importance during a war. Not only military but also diplomatic initiatives have gained importance at this point. Greece engaged in many activities both diplomatically and militarily before invading Anatolia. Greece's occupation of Anatolia proceeded within the framework of the foreign policy understanding of Western states. Greece participated in the Paris Peace Conference that began in January 1919 and tried to convince the Western states to invade Anatolia. Greece's diplomatic efforts marked the Paris Peace Conference.

The practices of Greece during the occupation of Anatolia and the oppression policies it pursued against the Anatolian people constitute an important part of this article. It will be seen that the Turkish side raised its voice in international public opinion against the massacres. Individual or collective petitions were sent to the High Commissioners of Western states and the League of Nations. Greece thought that the massacres committed during the Anatolian campaign, which it had undertaken with the support of the Allied states, would not make a sound impression on international public opinion. Nevertheless, after the facts were uncovered through the delegations sent to the region, the Allied powers warned the Greek authorities.

The murders committed by Greece in Anatolia before and during the Greek– Turkish War will be analyzed on the basis of Ottoman, British, American, and League of Nations archive documents. How the Greek authorities reacted to the murders committed and how they tried to explain what happened in the face of Western states will be examined by considering especially Greek archival documents. The massacres committed by Greece during Anatolia's occupation are an issue raised within the League of Nations. The crimes committed by the Greek army were examined by sending international delegations to Anatolia. Despite the reports prepared, the massacres of the Greek army in Anatolia could not be stopped.

In the first part of this article, the pre-war policies of Greece are discussed. In this context, Greece's initiatives at the Paris Peace Conference will be reviewed. Analyzing Greece's initiatives at the Paris Peace Conference is of great importance for understanding the course of the war. War negotiations between the Western states and Greece were on the agenda at the conference. In this context, it will be determined how Greek officials tried to convince the Allied states to invade Anatolia. The accuracy of the statistical information given by the Greeks about the number of Greeks in Anatolia during the conference will be one of the issues to be discussed in this article. Before the Paris Peace Conference, Greece undertook some activities in Anatolia. The issues related to this will be discussed within the scope of Ottoman archive documents.

In the second part of this article, the occupation of İzmir and its neighboring cities will be considered in detail. On 15 May 1919, after the Greek soldiers set foot in İzmir, the details of the violence policy they applied in the first few days will be given. It will be examined how the Allied states assessed the events. An international commission was established to investigate Greece's activities in İzmir. In particular, the comments of US military officials on the Greek invasion of Anatolia are quite remarkable. These evaluations will be revealed in this article through the American archive documents.

In the third part of the article, the reactions to the Greek invasion of Anatolia will be addressed. The reactions of both the public opinion of the Allied powers and the Turkish side will be analyzed, and the activities of Greece during the occupation of Anatolia will be focused on. In the last section, the occupation of Anatolia will be analyzed in detail in terms of both military and diplomatic activities. The ruthless attitude of Greece during the occupation of Anatolia will be evaluated within the scope of the petitions and letters sent by surviving witnesses to international organizations. During the occupation, it will be seen that the impulsive behaviours of the Greek soldiers, who acted with the support of the Allied powers, were too much. The fact that the massacres of

the Greek army in Anatolia were confirmed by the international delegation will be examined in detail in this section.

Thanks to the Ottoman, British, American, Greek, and League of Nations archive documents to be used, it will be tried to look at the activities of the Greeks in Anatolia from a new perspective. Likewise, the negotiations of the Allied powers regarding the Greek occupation will be revealed more clearly through diplomatic documents.

Preparatory Phase Before the Invasion: Paris Peace Conference

After the end of the First World War, the Entente states, the victors of the war, came together with the Alliance states, the losers of the war, and aimed to enter a period of peace. A peace conference was held in Paris on 18 January 1919 for ending the war on the table.¹ Eleftherios Venizelos participated in the Paris Peace Conference on the side of the Entente states. During the conference, Venizelos demanded that Epirus, Thrace, the Aegean Islands, and Western Anatolia be given to Greece, acting in accordance with the Megali Idea². Throughout the conference, Venizelos was very insistent on these territories. He believed that these places should be given to Greece in return for the sacrifices it had made during the war.³

At the Paris Peace Conference, the Great Powers sought to restore the balance of power in Europe and to take steps to meet the demands of their own publics. At this conference it was decided that the map of Europe should be redrawn. It also envisaged changes to the borders of the Ottoman State in the East. In this context, the control of Western Anatolia by a powerful state like Italy was rejected and it was decided that Greece, which was under the control of the Great Powers, would be active in this region. French Prime Minister Clemenceau and British Prime Minister Lloyd George considered

¹ Dilara Uslu, "Paris Barış Konferansı'ndaki Yunan İsteklerinin Batı Basınına Yansımaları", *History Studies: International Journal of History*, Vol 4, No 2, 2012, p. 362.

² Megali Idea, translated as "Great Idea", emerged with the Greek revolt movement in 1821. Officially, in 1844, the Prime Minister of Greece, Ioannis Kolettis, pointed to this concept in his speech in the Greek parliament on 14 January 1844. He stated that Greece's main goal is to civilize the East by Hellenizing it. He also mentioned that Greece was not just Greece and that it should expand and become a Kingdom (Michael M. Finefrock, "Atatürk, Lloyd George and the Megali Idea: Cause and Consequence of the Greek Plan to Seize Constantinople from the Allies, June-August 1922", *The Journal of Modern History*, Volume 52, No 1, 1980, p. 1049; Outku Kırılı Ntokme, "Ulus Devlet Oluşturmada Yunanistan Örneği: Büyük-Ülkü-Megali İdea", *Ankara Üniversitesi Türk İnkılap Tarihi Enstitüsü Atatürk Yolu Dergisi*, Volume 12, No 46, 2010, p. 413).

³ Nicholas X. Rizopoulos, *Greece at the Paris Peace Conference, 1919: Venizelos and the Greek Territorial Problem: From the Armistice to Versailles (November 1918 – June 1919)*, PhD Dissertation, Yale University, 1963, p. I.

Italy's settlement in the İzmir region to be against their national interests. It was thought that a weak Greece would be better able to defend Britain's interests in Western Anatolia than Italy, which had a strong navy in the Mediterranean, because Italy was very difficult to keep under control. During the conference, Greece could only take part in sessions that dealt with its own problems. In this regard, the Greek delegation had put into practice the strategy of influencing the Great Powers. In addition, the only rival to Greece's territorial claims was Italy. At this stage, the Greek press published articles in favour of the annexation of İzmir to Greece. The Greek Information Office (*Bureau d'Information Hellénique*) in Paris was a place of propaganda. Moreover, the false perception created through Venizelos was influencing Western statesmen. Lloyd George believed that Venizelos was the greatest statesman since Pericles. Venizelos stated that the British navy could reach India by using Greek ports. He also implied that Britain could achieve its war aims in the Middle East through Greece.⁴

Venizelos argued that the Turks in Western Anatolia should have migrated through population exchange. In this context, Greece believed that it would create a homogenous population in Western Anatolia. At the conference, Venizelos demanded that Northern Epirus, which consisted of Albanians and Greeks, be granted to Greece. He indicated that Greece should play a role in the regions of Western and Eastern Thrace, where Muslims were the majority in Greek statistical data. Venizelos claimed that the places in the Marmara Region, starting from Bandırma to Meis Island, should be given to Greece. Accordingly, İzmir and Aydın regions were among the territories claimed by Greece. Venizelos, citing the Greek Patriarchate's 1912 population records as an example, asserted that the Greek population in Aydın Province was 800.000, while the number of Turks was around 1 million. Venizelos also argued that Western Anatolia should be left to Greece under so-called historical and cultural claims.⁵ However, it must be acknowledged that Venizelos was motivated solely by political considerations. According to the population records of the Ottoman State dated 1914, the number of Muslims in Aydın Province was 1.249.067 while the number of Greeks was 299.096.⁶ In

⁴ Esra Özşüer, "Eleftherios Venizelos'un Hatıratında Paris Barış Konferansı Ve İzmir'in Yunanlara Brakılma Kararı", *Selçuk Üniversitesi Türkiyat Araştırmaları Dergisi*, No 59, 2023, pp. 274-290.

⁵ Michael Llewellyn Smith, "Venizelos' Diplomacy, 1910-23: From Balkan Alliance to Greek-Turkish Settlement", *Eleftherios Venizelos: The Trials of Statesmanship*, ed. Paschalis M. Kitromilides, Edinburgh University Press, Edinburgh, 2006, pp. 158-159.

⁶ Kemal Karpat, *Ottoman Population, 1830-1914: Demographic and Social Characteristics*, The University of Wisconsin Press, Madison, 1985, p. 188.

accordance with the census conducted by the Ottoman State in 1917 for the Aydın Province, the number of Muslims was 1.291.962 while the number of Greeks was 233.914.⁷ In a document written on 21 May 1919 by the US authority in İstanbul, it was stated that the number of Turks in İzmir was around 1.5 million. The Turkish population accounted for 83% of the total population of İzmir.⁸ The information provided by Venizelos at the Paris Peace Conference regarding the number of Greeks was misleading. Venizelos overestimated the number of Greeks living in Anatolia and demanded that this region be granted to Greece. The data obtained from different sources show that the figures given by Venizelos regarding the number of Greeks contradict the official figures. Moreover, during the conference, Venizelos said that Trabzon could be annexed to Armenia.⁹ Thus, it was accepted that the Greeks in Trabzon would remain under Armenian rule.

While Britain and France looked favorably upon the territorial demands of Greece, the US and Italy opposed them. The secret Treaty of London was signed between Italy and Britain, France and Russia on 26 April 1915. Accordingly, Italy was promised territory in Western Anatolia.¹⁰ Because of this, the Italians withstood Greece's demand for the territories promised to them before the war. In addition, in January 1915, Venizelos prepared a memorandum to King Constantine in which he argued in favour of going to war in Anatolia. However, this approach of Venizelos was not supported.¹¹ According to Italy, the population ratio of Greeks in the territories claimed by Greece was incompatible with reality. Italy did not believe that Greece had the power to establish sovereignty in these territories.¹² Italy objected to Venizelos' expansionist policy. At this very moment, Italian Foreign Minister Tomaso Tittoni and Venizelos came together and signed an agreement in Paris on 29 July 1919. According to this treaty, Greece's territorial claims in Northern Epirus were recognized. In addition, Italy abandoned the islands under its

⁷ Süleyman Tekir, "Yunan İşgali Öncesi İzmir ve Çevresinde Rum Faaliyetleri", *Çağdaş Türkiye Tarihi Araştırmaları Dergisi*, Volume XIX, Special Issue, 2019, p. 36.

⁸ The United States National Archives, 103-1/191020/474, (21 May 1919).

⁹ Eleftherios Venizelos, *Greece Before the Peace Congress of 1919: A Memorandum Dealing With the Rights of Greece*, Oxford University Press, New York, 1919, p. 20.

¹⁰ Ömer Osman Umar&Melek Yenisu, "Gizli Antlaşmalar Çerçevesinde San Remo Konferansı'nda Ortadoğu'yu Şekillendirme Çabaları", *Atatürk Araştırma Merkezi Dergisi (ATAM)*, Volume XXXVI, No 101, 2020, p. 40.

¹¹ Seçil Akgün, "Yunanistan'da Kurtuluş Savaşı'nı İzleyen Gelişmeler", *Çağdaş Türkiye Tarihi Araştırmaları Dergisi*, Volume 1, No 3, 1993, pp. 10-11.

¹² Aydın Özgören, "Paris'te Yunan Propagandası 1919-1920", *Karadeniz Araştırmaları Enstitüsü Dergisi*, Volume 8, No 15, 2022, p. 361.

occupation in the Aegean, except the island of Rhodes, in favour of Greece. Italy was to grant wide autonomy to Rhodes. Italy was aware of Britain's support for Greece and tried to reach an agreement with Greece in order to liberate Rhodes and some of the Dodecanese islands. This treaty was welcomed in the Greek press, but it was not implemented between Italy and Greece. At this point, it is necessary to take into account the efforts of Britain, which wanted to completely exclude Italy from this region. On 17 May 1920, the US Senate announced that it had ceded Rhodes and the Dodecanese Islands to Greece, and Italy annulled the Tittoni-Venizelos Treaty.¹³ On 14 July 1918, in an article titled "Italy– Greece Relations" published in the *Gazette de Lausanne*, it was stated that Venizelos' ambitious policy approach harmed Italy and that the Allied powers kept Greece under control due to this approach of Venizelos.¹⁴ British and French officials believed that the port of İzmir could be annexed to Greece for economic reasons. US officials, on the other hand, did not believe the population figures claimed by Greece. According to the US, the statistics given by Greece regarding the Greek population in Western Anatolia were unrealistic. The US was aware that the Greeks were a minority.¹⁵

Greeks in Western Anatolia began to engage in excesses against the Muslim population before the Paris Peace Conference. In the telegram sent from the Ministry of Interior (*Dâhiliye Nezâreti*) to the Aydın Province on 11 January 1919, it was stated that the Greeks in Urla and Çeşme had committed massacres against the Muslim population and that the necessary investigation should be carried out.¹⁶ While Greece was trying to persuade the Western states at the Paris Peace Conference, the Greeks in Western Anatolia were involved in activities disrupting public order in the region.

While the conference was in progress, tensions were high between the Greeks and Muslims around İzmir and Aydın. The French and Italians were at odds over which country's flag to fly in İzmir. Greece and Italy closely followed

¹³ Tuğba Belenli, "Türkiye-İtalya-Yunanistan Üçgeninde Rodos ve Oniki Ada (1911-1930)", *Ankara Üniversitesi Türk İnkılâp Tarihi Enstitüsü Atatürk Yolu Dergisi*, No 64, 2019, p. 82; Spyros Loumakis, "Nike of Paionios: Paionios's of Smyrna New Irredentist Victorious Symbol", *The Legacy of Antiquity: New Perspectives in the Reception of the Classical World*, ed. L. Kouneni, Newcastle upon Tyne, Cambridge Scholars Publishing, UK, 2013, p. 233.

¹⁴ Ahmet Tetik & Yusuf Dinçel, *Hâriciye Nezâreti ve Başkumandanlık Vekâleti SİYASİ İstihbârât Raporları 1918*, Nobel Akademik Yayıncılık, Ankara, 2022, pp. 333-334.

¹⁵ Eleftheria Daleziou, *Britain and the Greek-Turkish war and settlement of 1919-1923: the pursuit of security by "proxy" in Western Asia Minor*, PhD Dissertation, University of Glasgow, 2002, p. 82.

¹⁶ T.C. Cumhurbaşkanlığı Devlet Arşivleri Başkanlığı Osmanlı Arşivi (BOA), Dâhiliye Nezâreti Şifre Kalemi (DH.ŞFR), 95/93, H. 08 Rabiulahir 1337 (M. 11 Ocak 1919).

each other's military moves. Italy had ready troops on the island of Rhodes.¹⁷ There were 1200 Italian soldiers between the Konya and Eskişehir Anatolian railways. According to the information provided by the British Military Intelligence, there were Italian soldiers from Antalya to Ephesus, including Marmaris, Bodrum, Söke and Kuşadası. During these developments, Antalya was occupied by Italy on 3 April 1919. Bodrum, Marmaris and Kuşadası were occupied by the Italians on 12 May 1919, three days before the Greek occupation of İzmir. Italy objected to Greece's control of the İzmir-Aydın railroad. Greek and Italian soldiers confronted each other in Çerkezköy, northeast of Söke. After the Greek commander decided to evacuate the area, the possibility of a conflict between Greece and Italy disappeared.¹⁸ Due to Italy's aggressive attitude, Venizelos succeeded in convincing Britain, France, and the US to intervene militarily in Western Anatolia.¹⁹

During the Conference, Greece and Italy confronted each other in Anatolia. The US, which initially opposed Greece's invasion of Anatolia, supported Greece's troop landing in İzmir after Italy's occupation of Antalya.²⁰ With the support of the Entente states, Greece accelerated its military activities in Anatolia. In a letter dated 7 April 1919, *Dâhiliye Nezâreti Emniyet-i Umumiye Müdüriyeti* reported that weapons and ammunition were being shipped to the Anatolian coasts through the ships of the Greek navy, and that the Greek Red Cross was causing confusion in the regions it visited.²¹ In a letter dated 19 April 1919 written by the Ministry of Interior, it was stated that the Greek Red Cross had penetrated Anatolian villages and carried out activities outside its purpose.²² It operated in Anatolia as part of Greece's foreign policy apparatus. Before Greece invaded Anatolia, she was trying to mature the conditions in the region.

Greece's confrontation with Italy in Anatolia led the Entente states to act in favour of Greece. Although it was known by the Entente states that the figures given by Greece about the Greeks in Anatolia were not accurate, Greece's

¹⁷ British Library: India Office Records and Private Papers, Mss Eur F112/278/35/348 (22 April 1919).

¹⁸ India Office Records and Private Papers, Mss Eur F112/278/48/348 (June 1919).

¹⁹ Christopher Kinley, *Reclaiming The Unredeemed: Irredentism and The National Schism In Greece's First World War*, PhD Dissertation, The University of North Carolina, 2016, p. 63.

²⁰ Victoria Solomonidis, *Greece in Asia minor: the Greek administration of the Vilayet of Aidin, 1919-1922*, PhD Dissertation, King's College/University of London, 1984, p. 41.

²¹ BOA, DH. ŞFR., 98/73, H. 06 Recep 1337 (M. 7 Nisan 1919).

²² BOA, Dâhiliye Nezâreti Kalem-i Mahsus (DH.KMS), 51/41, H. 18 Recep 1337 (M. 19 Nisan 1919).

occupation of Anatolia was allowed due to Italy's strong position in the Mediterranean.

Occupation of İzmir and its Surrounding Areas

Before the occupation of İzmir on 15 May 1919, Greece was trying to complete its military preparations. On 6 May 1919, Lloyd George, the biggest supporter of Greece, proposed that Greece should land two or three divisions of troops in İzmir on the pretext of protecting the Greeks in Anatolia. Georges Clemenceau and US President Woodrow Wilson responded positively to the British proposal.²³ In the order sent by Venizelos to General Paraskevopoulos on 6 May 1919, it was stated that the division of the 1st Army should be ready and that it might be possible to send another division to İzmir. It was also stated in the order that there were one each of British, French and US dreadnoughts in İzmir, and that a Greek battleship and two destroyers were stationed in the region. Venizelos underlined that the time was now short and that preparations should continue without wasting any time.²⁴

In a letter sent by Venizelos to the Greek Ministry of Foreign Affairs on 6 May 1919, it was mentioned that a gendarmerie force of 500 soldiers should be prepared and that Aristidis Steryadis, the Greek High Commissioner for İzmir, should go to İzmir with a destroyer on behalf of Venizelos due to the necessity of having an advisor close to the soldiers in the field. The letter also emphasized the need to pay attention to the rules of secrecy so that the military landing could occur without any warning to the Turkish side.²⁵ In a telegram sent by the Greek commander Nikolaos Mavroudis to Venizelos on 10 May 1919, he said that the Turkish side was armed for defensive purposes and that it was better for Greek troops to operate along the coastal line, not only in İzmir.²⁶ The Greek authorities made maximum efforts to ensure that there was no military deficiency before the invasion. On the other side, the Turkish side knew that the invasion would take place.

On 15 May 1919, after the Greek occupation of İzmir began, Greek soldiers were instructed not to enter the area where Turkish barracks were located. However, this was not obeyed. The Turkish barracks and the Government House were entered and about 300 Turkish officials were arrested. Those arrested were then massacred by Greek soldiers and local

²³ Erik Goldstein, "Great Britain and Greater Greece 1917-1920", *The Historical Journal*, Vol 32, No 2, 1989, p. 352.

²⁴ Benaki Museum, Eleftherios Venizelos Archive 017-35, (06 May 1919).

²⁵ Benaki Museum, Eleftherios Venizelos Archive 017-37, (06 May 1919).

²⁶ Benaki Museum, Eleftherios Venizelos Archive 017-45, (10 May 1919).

Greeks. It is unclear how many people lost their lives during the Greek massacre in İzmir.²⁷ Greek soldiers acted by ignoring orders given by their commanders. Instead of taking control of the city, they chose to slaughter innocent people. The events that occurred drew a great reaction both locally and internationally.

The naval commanders of the Allied states held a meeting before the invasion. The American side argued that the Allied marines and Greek forces should cooperate in different parts of the city. However, Britain stated that it was in favour of the Greek forces managing this operation alone.²⁸ After the Greek occupation forces landed troops in İzmir on 15 May 1919, they committed massacres against the Muslim population. The US State Department received numerous telegrams from İstanbul regarding the Greek atrocities in İzmir. Although most of these telegrams were written by Turks, Americans living in İstanbul or İzmir reported the Greek massacres to the US State Department too.²⁹ The Turkish side considered the Greek occupation of İzmir as a humiliating behavior.³⁰ The readiness of the Turks to give their lives rather than lose İzmir is reflected in American archive documents.³¹ Greece's capacity to manage the occupation of Anatolia appears to have been very low. The number of murders committed by the Greeks was so high that Americans living in the region felt the need to report the situation to their ministries.

On 16 May 1919, the houses of the Muslim population in Bornova, İzmir, were looted by Greek soldiers. Greek soldiers threatened to kill the Muslim population if they were reported. The houses of Dr. Galip Bey, retired Major Tahsin Bey, retired Hüseyin Hüsnü Efendi, and others were looted, and their losses amounted to approximately 5000 Turkish liras. The jewelry worn by the wife and daughters of Dr. Galip Bey was stolen by Greek soldiers by tearing it from their necks. According to the order of the Greek Commander, Muslims were forbidden from opening their shops on Sundays before the rituals in

²⁷ India Office Records and Private Papers, Mss Eur F112/278/49/348 (26 August 1919).

²⁸ George Horton, *The Blight of Asia: An Account of the Systematic Extermination of Christian Populations by Mohammedans and of the Culpability of Certain Great Powers; with the True Story of the Burning of Smyrna*, The Bobbs-Merrill Company, Indianapolis, 1926, p.73.

²⁹ Peter M. Buzanski, "The Interallied Investigation of the Greek Invasion of Smyrna, 1919", *The Historian*, Vol 25, No 3, 1963, p. 327.

³⁰ The United States National Archives, 103-1/12317/423, (17 May 1919).

³¹ The United States National Archives, 103-1/20017/429, (17 May 1919).

Christian churches were over.³² During the occupation of İzmir, the Greeks carried out intensive arrests.³³

According to a report written by a US Naval Officer on 25 May 1919, the massacres committed by Greece in Western Anatolia are not surprising to those who know the Greeks. The interesting point here is that the Greeks were able to carry out these murders despite the restraining influence of the Entente states. Without the restraining influence of the Allied powers, the massacres committed by the Greeks in Western Anatolia would have been unimaginable. The events that occurred are the biggest proof that Greece could not rule any region in the Near East. Admiral Calthorpe, returning from İzmir, stated to the US naval officer that Greece had handled the İzmir landing very badly. The plan for the Greek troops landing in İzmir was as follows: Greek forces would first enter the outskirts or the suburbs and surround the city. Then, they would settle inside the city and take over the official institutions. Admiral Calthorpe had sent instructions to the Turkish forces to hand over the barracks. However, Greek soldiers did not adhere to this plan and opened random fire on Turkish barracks. Greece claimed that the first shots were fired from Turkish barracks, but no evidence of this was found. In the chaos that ensued, Muslim homes were looted, and Turkish women were raped by Greeks. Similarly, the persecution of Jews by Greek troops in Thrace, another example from a different region, provides crucial evidence of Greece's incapacity to govern any territory.³⁴ On the first day of the occupation of İzmir, the Metropolitan of İzmir, Hrisostomos, welcomed the Greek soldiers with enthusiasm. Meanwhile, the bells of İzmir's churches rang out to welcome the Greek army. During the occupation, the Metropolitan acted as the official representative of Greece. He personally greeted and blessed the delegations coming from Greece. In his speeches, he emphasized that the killing of Turks was a sacred duty. In this way, he tried to mobilize the Greeks and Greek soldiers in the region. Hrisostomos was in contact with the representatives of the Allied powers and closely followed the atrocities committed against the Turks. Also, the Greek army and the local Greeks acted together and carried out massacres.³⁵

³² The Permanent Bureau of the Turkish Congress at Lausanne, *Greek Atrocities in the Vilayet of Smyrna (May to July 1919): Unedited Documents and Evidence of English and French Officers: First Series*, Lausanne, 1919, p. 15.

³³ The United States National Archives, 103-1/18018/435, (18 May 1919).

³⁴ The United States National Archives, 103-1/3423/19, (25 May 1919).

³⁵ Bülent Atalay, "İşgal Döneminde İzmir Metropoliti Hrisostomos (1919-1922)", *Trakya Üniversitesi Sosyal Bilimler Dergisi*, Vol 11, No 1, 2009, pp. 36-38.

The Greek army committed brutal acts against the defenceless Turkish population in İzmir and the Turks were massacred en masse. Houses were broken into, and the property of the Muslim population was seized by the Greek army. Women and even young girls were subjected to the violence of Greek soldiers. The Greek brutality was so great that the Allied powers had to send an investigation delegation to İzmir. The delegation, consisting of American, British, French, and Italian admirals and generals, arrived in İzmir and made detailed inquiries. A report was prepared containing the crimes committed by the Greeks against the Turks. However, the Entente states did not publish the report because it was inconvenient to publicize the crimes committed by the Greek army.³⁶ Prime Minister Venizelos personally requested the Entente states to keep the report confidential. He also indicated that a new commission should be established to conduct the investigation.³⁷

The Entente states warned the Greeks not to expand their occupation areas and advised them to refrain from massacres of the Muslim population. Although the crimes committed by the Greeks in Western Anatolia were accepted, Venizelos was warned and it was decided at the Paris Peace Conference that the Greek occupation should continue on the condition that it was temporary.³⁸ Venizelos rejected the explanation that the occupation of İzmir was temporary.³⁹ He thought that the occupation of İzmir should be permanent.⁴⁰

Reactions to the Occupation

After the occupation of İzmir, Mustafa Kemal Atatürk went to Samsun as the 9th Army Inspector on 19 May 1919 to investigate the unrest. However, his real intention was to start the *Turkish War of Independence* after the Greek occupation of İzmir. He met with the British authorities in Samsun and stated that the Turks would not accept foreign rule and that the Greeks had no rights in Anatolia. He emphasized that İzmir held the same importance to the Turks as İstanbul.⁴¹ Upon the increasing reaction, Venizelos sent a letter to Georges

³⁶ Colonel Rachid Galib, "Smyrna During the Greek Occupation", *Current History*, Vol 18, No 2, 1923, p. 318.

³⁷ The League of Nations Archives, 11/1958/1696, (8 November 1919).

³⁸ Mustafa Turan, "İstiklal Harbî'nde "Müttefiklerarası Tahkik Heyeti" Çalışmaları, Raporu ve Tahkikat Neticesi", *Atatürk Yolu Dergisi*, Vol 2, No 8, 1991, p. 720.

³⁹ The League of Nations Archives, 11/2076/1696, (18 November 1919).

⁴⁰ The United States National Archives, 103-1/18018/435, (18 May 1919).

⁴¹ Osman Akandere, "Millî Mücadelenin Başlarında Mustafa Kemal Paşada Sine-i Millet Düşüncesi İle Askerlikten İstifası Öncesi ve Sonrası Kendisine Gösterilen Bağlılıklar", *Selçuk Üniversitesi Türkiyat Araştırmaları Dergisi*, No 11, 2002, pp. 249-253.

Clemenceau on 29 May 1919. In the letter, it was indicated that Greek troops landed in İzmir on 15 May 1919 with the will of the Entente States and that the city was taken over without any incident, accompanied by the cheers of the Greek people. It was stated that a total of 163 people lost their lives in the clashes that broke out in the areas where Turks were predominantly concentrated.⁴² Venizelos chose to stay in close contact with the leaders of the Entente states to show that the occupation of İzmir was successfully managed. Due to the pressures in the international arena, he preferred to soften the events.

Greece, on the one hand, increased military pressure and, on the other hand, sought to conduct superficial investigations related to the incidents. On 29 June 1919, Venizelos requested information from the High Commissioner of İzmir Aristidis Steryadis, and Major General Konstantinos Nieder to learn about the excesses of the Greek army against Muslims during the landing at İzmir. The correspondence stated that the army had committed excessive acts during the landing at İzmir and that this situation jeopardized our national security. At the Paris Peace Conference, British officials demanded an inquiry into the massacre of captive Turks and Greece's massacres in İzmir were heavily criticized in the British press. To ease the pressure on Greece, it was emphasized that the massacres should be accepted as true and that the officers who committed the barbarity should be punished.⁴³ The massacres of Muslims by Greek soldiers during the landing at İzmir were confirmed by Venizelos himself. Due to international pressure at the Paris Peace Conference, he requested an urgent investigation. It is understood from this document that even captive Turks were subjected to Greek atrocities.

The events that took place were discussed in the British parliament. It was expressed that after the Greek troops landed in İzmir, there were internal disturbances and conflicts. It was noted that Greece had massacred innocent civilians and that measures should be taken. It was hoped that the Greeks would punish the soldiers involved in the massacres. The question of what the effects of the events in İzmir would be on the public in Egypt and India remained unanswered in the parliament.⁴⁴ Colonel Aubrey Herbert, a member of the House of Commons, reported that the Greeks had executed Turkish prisoners in İzmir in full view of the Allied powers, and the British

⁴² Benaki Museum, Eleftherios Venizelos Archive 021-01, (29 May 1919).

⁴³ Benaki Museum, Eleftherios Venizelos Archive 019-47, (29 June 1919).

⁴⁴ Benaki Museum, Eleftherios Venizelos Archive 018-32, (05 June 1919).

Government spokesman confirmed this.⁴⁵ The actions of Greece put Britain in a difficult situation both in domestic and foreign policy.⁴⁶

In a letter written by the Turkish Women's Delegation of İstanbul (*İstanbul Türk Kadınları Heyeti*) to the President of the United States on 22 May 1919, it was stated that the unjust occupation of İzmir had deeply hurt the Turks and that the sovereignty of the Turks had been damaged by this occupation.⁴⁷ In a letter sent by the members of the Alaşehir Turkish Women's Association to the American Senate on 30 May 1919, it was declared that the massacres committed against women in İzmir were protested and that the incidents were deeply regretted. It was said that Western countries would be responsible for what would happen if these treatments against Muslim women continued.⁴⁸ On the other side, the Greek massacres in İzmir had a heavy impact on the people of Anatolia. Muslims in Anatolia sent letters to Western states and attempted to show the Greek atrocities in İzmir. The main purpose of the diplomatic initiatives of the women's organizations before the Western states was to show the tragedy in İzmir to the world.

Around Bodrum and Marmaris, violent protests were organized by Turks against Greek occupation.⁴⁹ Protests against the Greek occupation were not organized by the Turkish government but occurred entirely on the initiative of the people themselves.⁵⁰ Greece was caught unprepared for the protests. In response to the reactions to the occupation, Greece tried to occupy more territory.

Greece, observing the Italian advance in the region, occupied Aydın and then Nazilli on 27 May 1919, despite the limitations of the Paris Peace Conference. However, with the intervention of Britain, Greece evacuated Nazilli between 20-25 June.⁵¹ After the decision to evacuate Nazilli, the Greek authorities began to think that they would have a serious confrontation with the Italians.⁵² After a three-hour battle between the Greeks and Turks in Aydın on

⁴⁵ Selahattin Tansel, *Mondros'tan Mudanya'ya Kadar (II. Cilt)*, Başbakanlık Kültür Müsteşarlığı Cumhuriyetin 50. Yıldönümü Yayınları, Ankara, 1973, p. 174.

⁴⁶ According to British actors, the Muslim population in India and Egypt would revolt because of the developments in İzmir.

⁴⁷ The United States National Archives, 103-1/09422/502, (22 May 1919).

⁴⁸ The United States National Archives, 103-1/14330/662, (30 May 1919).

⁴⁹ Benaki Museum, Eleftherios Venizelos Archive 018-178, (28 May 1919).

⁵⁰ The United States National Archives, 103-1/3423/19, (25 May 1919).

⁵¹ India Office Records and Private Papers, Mss Eur F112/278/49/348 (26 August 1919).

⁵² Benaki Museum, Eleftherios Venizelos Archive 019-27, (16 June 1919).

30 June 1919, the Greek soldiers were evacuated from Aydın. When the Greek soldiers evacuated Aydın, they took with them several high-ranking officials, including the governor and members of the Criminal Court. Some of these people were executed on the road to İzmir. Others were taken to İzmir and imprisoned. A new Greek force of 3200 men retook Aydın on 4 July 1919. During the Greek attacks, 25.000 Muslims were left homeless. The villages of Emirköy and Yeniköy were burned down by Greek soldiers. Greece captured Manisa on 25 May 1919 although it was not part of the occupation plan. Greek troops entered Bergama on 11 June 1919 and they were ambushed by the Turks in Bergama and forced to retreat. According to the British Military Control Officer, after the excessive behavior of the Greek soldiers, the Turkish Governor and his entourage were killed by the Greeks.⁵³ Following the Greek occupation, 63.000 Muslims from Aydın were forced to migrate to Nazilli, Çine and Söke.⁵⁴ The Greek side suffered heavy losses in the clashes between the Greek army and these Turkish troops, who acted in line with the Turkish National Struggle.⁵⁵

In the telegram sent by General Paraskevopoulos to Venizelos on 14 July 1919 about the situation in İzmir, it was noted that the organization of the Turks was gaining momentum and that the Greek troops remained in a passive position in the face of the attacks.⁵⁶ In the view of British intelligence, irregular units were formed among the Turks against the Greek occupation of Western Anatolia. According to an intelligence report prepared by the British in October 1919, it was reported that 20.000 irregular Turkish troops in Aydın and 25.000 irregular Turkish troops in İzmir came together against the Greek occupation.⁵⁷ As the Greek occupation gained momentum, the Turkish side formed irregular units for defence. The Greek side regarded these developments with concern. Greek military officials were worried about the direction in which this development would evolve.

The Turkish National Struggle reached an important threshold with the congress organized by Mustafa Kemal Atatürk in Erzurum on 23 July 1919. The rejection of the occupation of Anatolia was reiterated. It was declared that

⁵³ India Office Records and Private Papers, Mss Eur F112/278/50/348 (August 1919).

⁵⁴ Emine Pancar, "Yunan İşgalleri Karşısında Göç Hareketi", *Çağdaş Türkiye Tarihi Araştırmaları Dergisi*, Volume VIII, No 18-19, 2009, p. 61.

⁵⁵ Selahattin Tansel, *Mondros'tan Mudanya'ya Kadar (I.Cilt)*, Başbakanlık Kültür Müsteşarlığı Cumhuriyetin 50. Yıldönümü Yayınları, Ankara, 1973, p. 287.

⁵⁶ Benaki Museum, Eleftherios Venizelos Archive 021-144, (14 July 1919).

⁵⁷ A. L. MacFie, "British Intelligence and the Turkish National Movement, 1919-22", *Middle Eastern Studies*, Volume 37, No 1, 2001, pp. 5-6.

the outbreaks of Greek and Armenian groups in the eastern provinces would be resisted. In order to oppose the Greek occupation in Western Anatolia and to organize the resistance from a single point, the Turkish National Struggle held a congress in Balıkesir on 26-30 July 1919.⁵⁸

While the tension between the Turks and the Greeks was rising in Anatolia, the diplomatic conflict between Italy and Greece was continuing at the same time. At the Paris Peace Conference, discussions were held on the necessity of drawing a line between the Turks, Italians and Greeks in the Sanjak of İzmir. As a result, according to the decision taken on 14 October 1919, the withdrawal of Greece to the border of the Sanjak of İzmir and the occupation of the Büyük Menderes valley by the Allied powers, except for the Italians, including Greece, were finalised.⁵⁹ With this decision, Greece adopted a more oppressive administration approach in İzmir. Greece implemented practices such as press censorship and customs control in İzmir. It did not allow the local police in İzmir to work and prevented the jurisdiction of the courts.⁶⁰

In his report, the US Naval Officer stated that no one, including the Greeks in İzmir and İstanbul, had any knowledge of the extent to which the Greeks were authorized to occupy İzmir and its surroundings. The forced occupation of Ayvalık by the Greeks led to clashes. The exact scale of the clashes could not be determined. Because Greece imposes censorship on the press, it is very difficult to access clear information about the conflicts on the ground. It was forbidden to publish any news against the Greeks. Some newspapers in İstanbul published false news stating that Greece was welcomed with enthusiasm by both Greeks and Turks during the occupation of İzmir. According to the report, the US siding with Greece during the occupation of İzmir undermined its prestige.⁶¹ While the Greek occupation was progressing in line with military objectives, it was also continuing by putting pressure on the press. During that period of limited communication opportunities, it can be said that Greece tried to gain psychological superiority through the press.

On 31 October 1919, the British Foreign Office announced that it had taken the following decision on the islands: Tenedos and Imbros would belong to whichever state was sovereign over İstanbul. Greece was explicitly reminded that it had no sovereignty over these two islands.⁶² Since the Entente states

⁵⁸ Tansel, *ibid.*, pp. 55-59.

⁵⁹ The League of Nations Archives, 11/1696/1696, (14 October 1919).

⁶⁰ The League of Nations Archives, 11/2031/1696, (14 November 1919).

⁶¹ The United States National Archives, 103-1/3423/19, (25 May 1919).

⁶² The League of Nations Archives, 11/1860/1860, (31 October 1919).

were aware of Greece's attitude towards the islands, they declared in advance that these two islands could not be occupied by Greece. The negative impression of Greece during the occupation of İzmir and its aftermath was memorable. The ruthless attitude of Greece was attempted to be stopped by the intervention of the Entente powers, because Greece aspired to more than the role assigned to it by the Paris Peace Conference, and for this reason it had to be controlled. When the reactions after the occupation are analyzed, it is seen that Greece did not deviate from its original goal and was only allowed to conduct investigations for show.

Greece's Deepening Occupation of Western Anatolia

The Greek advance in Western Anatolia continued. Greek soldiers continued their massacres in the villages and towns that were close to İzmir without slowing down. On 14 January 1920, at 6 pm, about 20 Greek soldiers attacked Yeniköy and plundered the area. They tortured the villagers in order to extort tribute from them. After taking valuables, they left the village. The villagers who recognized the Greek soldiers went to the Greek authorities and made a complaint. But no compensation was given to the villagers for their damages. Society for the Defence of Ottoman Rights (*Müdafaa-i Milliye Cemiyeti*) arrives in the region to investigate the Greek atrocities in Western Anatolia. Members of the Society for the Defence of Ottoman Rights met with the British High Commissioner. During the meeting, the High Commissioner emphasized that the Turks had been at war with the Greeks for 4-5 years and that the incidents had been mutual. The members of the delegation stated that the Turks had never committed such brutal acts. However, at present, the Greeks have committed massacres against the Turkish population in Çeşme, Karaburun, and Foça. According to the members of the delegation, the Greeks wanted to systematically exterminate the Turks. It is known that the crimes committed by the Greeks were confirmed at the Paris Peace Conference, and they were warned not to repeat them. The Turks could not move from one village to another for fear of death. In the view of the members of the delegation, the Greek occupation of Anatolia has three aims: the total extermination of the Muslims, looting of innocent people's property, and thus the commercial destruction of the Muslims.⁶³ It is seen that Greece's activities during the occupation were publicized before the international community. According to the findings of Society for the Defence of Ottoman Rights, Greece was making great efforts not to let any Turkish element in Western Anatolia.

⁶³ The United States National Archives, 767. 68116/3, (22 April 1920).

The Allied powers held the London Conference on 12 February 1920. Greece's demands over Anatolia were discussed. There was a consensus among the Allied powers that Eastern and Western Thrace should be temporarily given to Greece. Nevertheless, Venizelos was promised by the Allied powers to grant administrative and religious privileges to the Turks in Edirne.⁶⁴ However, the US favored giving Edirne and the area around Kırklareli to Bulgaria on historical grounds.⁶⁵ Meanwhile, the Turkish National Struggle had begun in Anatolia. Britain and France were following developments closely.⁶⁶ During the conference, it was decided to occupy İstanbul and thus the government of İstanbul was cornered.⁶⁷

Greek troops reattacked Aydın in March 1920. The Greeks, who had captured the Gölcük plateau, massacred the Muslim population without discriminating between men and women. The Muslim population found the solution to flee.⁶⁸ The High Commissioner of İzmir, Aristidis Steryadis, in an interview with the British Red Cross representative Robert Frew about the displaced Turks in Aydın due to the Greek occupation, claimed that the Greeks treated the Muslims in Aydın fairly, but that the Greek administration could not provide the necessary assistance because most of the Turks lived outside the occupation zone.⁶⁹ As can be seen, Greece was trying to give the impression to the international public opinion that it had a fair administration in the occupied territories. But the Muslim population had to migrate due to the brutal behavior of Greek soldiers during the Greek occupation.

Between 1919 and 1921, the Greek occupation of Anatolia deepened with the support of the Allied powers. In April 1920, Britain was increasing its activity in the Marmara region. British troops had massed north of the Gulf of İzmit.⁷⁰ Yalova, Gemlik, Orhangazi, İzmit and other settlements on the Marmara coast, which had been under British occupation since 1920, were left to Greek military units. Greece again committed new massacres in these settlements too. The Greek army carried out acts of violence against the

⁶⁴ Alexander Karagiannis, *Greece's Quest for Empire at the Paris Peace Conference, 1919-1920: The Diplomacy of Illusions*, PhD Dissertation, Indiana University, 1981, pp. 357-360.

⁶⁵ The League of Nations Archives, S356/21/3, (31 March 1920).

⁶⁶ Umar - Yenisu, *ibid*, p. 51.

⁶⁷ Çağla Derya Tağmat, "Sevr Barış Antlaşması Sürecinde Eleftherios Venizelos: Görüşmeler, Konferanslar ve İmza", *Avrasya İncelemeleri Dergisi*, Volume 5, No 2, 2016, p. 315.

⁶⁸ The United States National Archives, 767. 68116/2730-20, (27 March 1920).

⁶⁹ Benaki Museum, Eleftherios Venizelos Archive 026-63, (31 January 1920).

⁷⁰ The United States National Archives, 867. 00/1209, (12 April 1920).

inhabitants by expelling official officers such as the district governor, police, and gendarmerie from the cities they occupied.⁷¹

While Greece's occupation of Anatolia continued without slowing down, the secret letter of Vice Admiral H.S. Knapp, Commander of the US Navy operating in Europe, questioning Greece's occupation of Anatolia on 1 June 1920 is remarkable in terms of showing that the Allied powers did not unconditionally support Greece. The letter contains the following statements: After the signing of the Treaty of Sèvres, the Greeks were left free to occupy Anatolia on the grounds that the Turks had not signed this treaty. It is obvious that the world was clearly deceived in these matters. Peace could not be established because the Greeks did not give up İzmir and Thrace. By seizing Thrace and İzmir, Greece wanted to realize the *Megali Idea* and gained commercial benefits. By deceiving international public opinion, the Greeks claimed that the Greek population in Thrace and İzmir was higher than the Turkish population.⁷² The US military official stated that Greece justified its invasion of Anatolia on false grounds.

Greece attached geopolitical importance to the Western Thrace region. In the telegram sent by Sir Henry Hughes Wilson, the British Chief of General Staff, to General Milne on 10 July 1920, it was reported that Venizelos was planning to send 2 divisions from Anatolia to Western Thrace. According to Venizelos, the occupation of Western Thrace would be a heavy blow to Türkiye. Moreover, He also stated that Bursa, Eskişehir and Afyonkarahisar would be occupied if the Turks continued to resist.⁷³ Despite all these threats Turkish National Forces (*Kuvâ-yı millîye*) did not give up the military struggle in the battlefield.⁷⁴

As the occupation progressed, Greece increased the extent of violence even more. In a petition written by the imam and mukhtar of the Umurbey village of Gemlik, the massacres of Greek soldiers were clearly revealed. According to the petition, after Gemlik was occupied by British soldiers in July 1920, control was transferred to the Greek army. On 24 August 1920, Gemlik was besieged by Greek soldiers. Greek soldiers entered the houses under the pretext of searching for weapons and severely beat the Muslim population. Greek soldiers

⁷¹ Nebahat Oran Arslan, "Yalova, Gemlik, Orhangazi ve İzmit (Samanlıdağ) Bölgesinde Yaşanan Yunan Mezalimi ve Bölgeye Gönderilen Uluslararası Tahkik Heyetinin Çalışmaları", *Atatürk Üniversitesi Türkiyat Araştırmaları Enstitüsü Dergisi*, No 22, 2003, pp. 304-306.

⁷² The United States National Archives, 867. 00/1328, (17 July 1920).

⁷³ Benaki Museum, Eleftherios Venizelos Archive 027-48/49, (10 July 1920).

⁷⁴ Esra Özsüer, "Yunan Ordusunun Anadolu İşgalinde Cepheden Gönderilen Asker Mektupları", *IX. Uluslararası Atatürk Kongresi*, 2019, p. 703.

plundered the gardens and caused considerable material damage. Two weeks after the occupation, 50 Muslim villagers were killed by Greeks. A woman and a 15-year-old girl were abducted by Greeks. Once again, Greek soldiers did not act in accordance with orders. Although the Greek commander had instructed that only weapons of war should be confiscated, Greek soldiers also confiscated hunting rifles too.⁷⁵

In the Treaty of Sèvres,⁷⁶ which was signed between the Ottoman State and the Entente states in August 1920 but never put into implementation, the defence and military order of İzmir was completely taken over by the Greeks. Also, Western Thrace was under the rule of Bulgaria before the First World War. After the war, it was transferred to the Allies with the Treaty of Neuilly signed between Bulgaria and the Entente states. With the Treaty of Sèvres, the administration of Western Thrace was granted to Greece. In Eastern Thrace, while minorities such as Jews and Vlachs (*Ulahlar*) were given security of life and property, it was decided that the administration would be transferred to Greece on the condition that the rights and laws of Muslims would be respected.⁷⁷

Starting from İzmir, the Greek army occupied Balıkesir, Bursa and Uşak, transported the livestock they captured in the villages to the islands, forced their way into the houses of the Muslim population under the pretext of searching for weapons and massacred them, which was brought to the agenda of the Grand National Assembly of Türkiye by Bursa member of parliament Emin Bey on 6 October 1920. The Greeks also imposed import–export restrictions in the areas they occupied to undermine the Turkish economy. Emin Bey mentioned in parliament on 27 October 1920 that Greek soldiers, who raised the Greek flag on government mansions, collected weapons from Muslims in Orhangazi and distributed them to Armenians and Greeks.⁷⁸

⁷⁵ The United States National Archives, 767. 68116/7/8476-20, (18 October 1920).

⁷⁶ The Treaty of Sèvres was signed in Paris, France, following an agreement reached through negotiations held in San Remo, Italy, one of the victorious nations of World War I. The Sèvres was a treaty imposed upon the Ottoman State during conferences where it was not regarded as an equal participant. In this treaty, military restrictions were imposed on the Ottoman State. In this way, it was intended to punish the Ottoman State for its participation in the First World War. The Western States' existing privileges in Anatolia were further extended by the Sèvres (Temuçin Faik Ertan, "Sevr ve Lozan Antlaşmaları Hakkında Karşılaştırmalı Bir Değerlendirme", *Ankara Üniversitesi Türk İnkılap Tarihi Enstitüsü Atatürk Yolu Dergisi*, Vol 15, No 58, 2016, pp. 21-37.)

⁷⁷ India Office Records and Private Papers, Mss Eur F112/278/215-218/348, (December 1921).

⁷⁸ *Arşiv Belgelerine Göre Balkanlar'da ve Anadolu'da Yunan Mevzâlimi: Anadolu'da Yunan Mevzâlimi*, Cilt II, Ankara, Başbakanlık Devlet Arşivleri Genel Müdürlüğü Osmanlı Arşivi Daire Başkanlığı, 1996, pp. 101-104.

The Turkish National Struggle caused considerable damage to the Greeks thanks to the armed resistance groups. However, after the outbursts of the Çerkez Ethem Bey in Western Anatolia and the establishment of the Grand National Assembly of Türkiye on 23 April 1920, it was decided to switch to a regular army in order to continue the struggle from a single point.⁷⁹ Thus, the regular Turkish army was established for the first time in November 1920. After the establishment of the regular army, the victories of the Turkish side followed one after another.⁸⁰ There were also some developments in Greek domestic politics during this period. On 14 November 1920, elections were held in Greece and, contrary to expectations, Venizelos lost against the opposition front. The war-weariness of the Greeks and the intensive intervention of France and Britain in Greek domestic politics can be seen as reasons for this result.⁸¹ This election result was also an indication of the war fatigue of the Greek army. The new government, taking advantage of King Constantine's popularity, began large-scale military preparations for Anatolia. However, the soldiers had interpreted the election results as the end of the war. These developments caused great disappointment among the soldiers.⁸² The Greek army began to collapse morally after the victories of the Turks. In the following years, the Greek army would increase the level of violence against the Muslim population even more. After the military failures, the Greeks began to burn and destroy many parts of Anatolia. Between the years 1920-1921, the violence committed by the Greeks against the Muslim population in Anatolia reached its highest level.

Similar massacres occurred wherever there was Greek occupation. On 16 November 1920, Servet Bey, Mayor of Bandırma, sent a letter to the US High Commissioner's Office, in which the following statements were made: Despite the statements of the Allied states about justice and equality, the Greek occupation army continues to systematically massacre Muslims. The places occupied by the Greeks are in ruins. The 20th-century inquisition is taking place in Bandırma unimaginably. Greeks and Armenians gathered in the Church before starting their massacres. This group, who insulted the Muslim

⁷⁹ Rıdvan Bal, "Kuva-yı Milliye'den Düzenli Orduya Geçiş Süreci Gelişmeleri ve Birinci İnönü Savaşına Etkileri", *Anadolu Üniversitesi Sosyal Bilimler Dergisi*, Vol 21, Special Issue, 2021, pp. 25-31.

⁸⁰ Nilüfer Erdem, "Yunan Kaynaklarına Göre 1922 Yılında Batı Anadolu'da Otonom Devlet Kurmaya Yönelik Faaliyetler", *Çağdaş Türkiye Tarihi Araştırmaları Dergisi*, Vol XIV, No 29, 2014, p. 100.

⁸¹ Hatice Yıldırım, "Türk Basınına Göre Venizelos'un 1920 Seçimlerini Kaybetmesi ve Yankıları", *Çağdaş Türkiye Tarihi Araştırmaları Dergisi*, Vol XX, No 41, 2020, p. 521.

⁸² Foti Benlisoy, *Kabramanlar, Kurbanlar, Direnişçiler: Milli Mücadele'de Yunan Ordusu'nda Komünist Propaganda, Grev ve İsyân (1919-1922)*, İstos Yayın, İstanbul, 2019, pp. 21-24.

population, mercilessly massacred the Muslims they caught on the street with axes and knives. Kırcağ and Konstantin, two Greek bandits who had been committing murder and looting offenses in Bandırma for years, were arrested by the Greek army for 4 months. However, these two bandits were released by the Greek army, and forty armed men were placed under their command. Many Muslims were massacred by this bandit group. The next day, bandits under the control of the Greeks attacked the mosque and broke the doors and windows.⁸³ During the war, Greek bandits made intensive efforts to drive the Turks out of Anatolia. Greek bandits formed by organizations such as *Mavri Mira*, *Ethnic Eteria* and *Kordus* received weapons aid from Western states and in this context, 3000 weapons were distributed to the Greeks in İstanbul.⁸⁴

In 1921, the Turkish National Struggle began to develop diplomatic relations with the Western countries to a greater extent. On 11 January 1921, after the 1st İnönü victory, the Ankara Government was invited to the conference to be held in London on 12 February 1921.⁸⁵ The Turkish National Struggle also achieved a diplomatic victory. The invitation of the Turkish side to the London Conference shows that military successes also brought diplomatic success.

Controlling Greece had become more challenging for the Entente powers. Thus, Britain contacted France and Italy on 26 April 1921, requesting a declaration of neutrality in the Turkish-Greek conflict. The proposal stated that the Allied powers would only take responsibility for İstanbul. The Italian government promptly accepted the proposition. France did not object to the proposal but requested for limitations on the activities of Greek forces in the Straits area. Britain agreed to this proposal.⁸⁶

Meanwhile, the massacres of the Greeks in Anatolia had increased to such an extent that ordinary Turkish citizens sent a letter to the League of Nations in April 1921, trying to voice their troubles in the international arena. The letter pointed out that the Greeks had caused massacres in the regions they occupied and that the Greeks, encouraged by the silence of the Entente states and the League of Nations in the face of these massacres, had further increased the extent of violence. It was also stated that Muslims were victims of the arbitrary

⁸³ The United States National Archives, 767. 68116/8/274-20, (16 November 1920).

⁸⁴ Hasan Ali Polat, "Millî Mücadele Yıllarında Marmara Bölgesi'nde Faaliyet Gösteren Rum ve Ermeni Çeteleri", *Selçuk Üniversitesi Sosyal Bilimler Enstitüsü Dergisi*, No 26, 2011, p.269.

⁸⁵ Fahri Yetim, "Millî Mücadele Dönemi Türk Dış Politikasında İlkel Yaklaşımlar ve Uygulama Örnekleri", *Atatürk Araştırma Merkezi Dergisi (ATAM)*, Vol XXVII, No 79, 2011, p. 86.

⁸⁶ Abdurrahman Bozkurt, "İtilaf Devletleri'nin Türk-Yunan Savaşı'nda Tarafsızlık İlanı (13 Mayıs 1921)", *Atatürk Araştırma Merkezi Dergisi (ATAM)*, Vol 26, No 76, 2010, pp. 42-43.

attitudes of the occupation administration. It was emphasized that the League of Nations should take responsibility and prevent the Greek massacres.⁸⁷

Notwithstanding all individual and collective efforts, the Greeks did not refrain from committing massacres in Anatolia. In Erdek and Karabiga, many Turks lost their lives because of violence perpetrated by Greek bands. The village of Araplar in Erdek was attacked by Greek bands. A large part of the village was burned down, and only 30 out of 150 houses survived the fire. Thanks to the intervention of the British authorities, some villagers were able to escape the massacre. The scene was the same in all regions occupied by the Greeks. Muslims are being systematically exterminated.⁸⁸

The extermination operations of the Greeks against the Muslims had a great impact on international public opinion. In response to the growing reactions, successive requests were made to the representatives of the Allied powers to send a commission of enquiry to the region. Thus, an international delegation was sent to the regions occupied by the Greeks to determine the massacres. A team consisting of British General Franks, the head of the delegation, French Colonel Vick, Italian Colonel Rolletto, Captain Stone, General Franks' aide, and Mr. Gehri, the representative of the International Red Cross, set foot in Gemlik on 12 May 1921. Gendarmerie Officer Süreya Bey and Refik Efendi from Orhangazi, Hafız Ahmet Efendi from Çınarcık, Emin and Tevfik Efendi from Gemlik joined the international delegation from the Turkish side. The members of the commission asked questions to the refugees about the Greek massacres. Greek soldiers tried to arrest Hafız Ahmet Efendi, who was trying to obtain information from the refugees, but the Greeks failed to arrest him due to the efforts of the international delegation. When the members of the Commission saw the fire in the village of Çeltikçi, they wanted to visit this place. Before the Greek soldiers burned the houses of the Muslims, they stole valuables. The Orhangazi village of 1000 inhabitants was burned down and only 5 people were saved. The members of the delegation also took photographs of the mosques destroyed by bombs. The representative of the International Red Cross, Mr. Gehri, visited the people in the intact mosques and madrasahs sheltering the refugees and recorded their testimonies. Refik Efendi and Gendarmerie Officer Mustafa Süreya were arrested by local Greek and Armenian soldiers. However, they were released after the delegation members intervened. In other settlements visited by members of the delegation, the same scene was

⁸⁷ The League of Nations Archives, 11/12274/1696, (2 April 1921).

⁸⁸ BOA, Hariciye Nezareti Siyasi Kısım (HR.SYS), 2707/57 (M. 22.06.1921)

witnessed.⁸⁹ The international delegation appeared astonished by what they saw. Greece gave the Allied powers the impression that it had always treated the Muslims in the region fairly. However, it was clear that Greece wanted to exterminate the Muslims in Anatolia.

The information obtained from American officials traveling to the Southern Marmara region is similar. It is indicated that the villages around Gemlik, Yalova, and Mudanya Bay were demolished and bombed by Greek soldiers. Admiral Bristol asked the Greek Commander to make a written statement about the systematic destruction of Turkish villages and the killing of many innocent people. However, this request was not responded to. Greek soldiers failed to maintain order and there was chaos⁹⁰ and the massacres committed by the Greek army coincide with the information contained in different archive documents.

Mr. Gehri, the representative of the International Red Cross, published a report as a result of his investigations between 12-22 May 1921. Samanlıdağ, the region subject to the examination, is located between the gulfs of İzmit and Mudanya on the Marmara coast. The main settlements of the region consisted of İzmit, Karamürsel, Pazarköy (Yenice), İzmit, Yalova and Gemlik. The investigation was conducted in an impartial manner and the testimonies of Turks, Armenians and Greeks were taken. The international delegation concluded from its investigations that the Greek army troops tried to exterminate the Muslim population for about 2 months. The villages burnt and massacres committed by the Greeks and irregular Greek civilian bands.⁹¹

Greece, which had begun to lose control in Anatolia, announced in May 1921 that the southern part of the Sea of Marmara would be under blockade and merchant ships would be seized. US officials expressed that US merchant ships would not accept such a blockade. Greece stated that all foreign vessels would be searched for arms smuggling. This decision was protested by Britain, France and Italy. Greece was attempting to exert all kinds of pressure against the movement in Anatolia under the leadership of Mustafa Kemal Atatürk.⁹² As Greece was faced with difficulties in the occupation of Anatolia, in order to suppress the Anatolian movement, it made moves that the Allied powers did not approve of. At this point, it is seen that the Greeks started to lose the war.

⁸⁹ *Atrocités Grecques en Turquie: Second Livre*, Ministre de l'intérieur, Imprimerie Ahmed Ihsan & Cie, Constantinople, 1921 pp. 4-13.

⁹⁰ The United States National Archives, 767. 68116/17, (7 June 1921).

⁹¹ *Ibid*, pp. 296-299.

⁹² The United States National Archives, 767. 68112/1, (6-7 May 1921).

Greece, which took initiatives whose results were not calculated, would start to lose the support of the Allied powers.

According to the Montreal Star newspaper of 8 June 1921, the Turkish army under Mustafa Kemal was planning an attack to retake İstanbul. The Turks were in good military shape. British policy had allowed the Greeks to take İstanbul, but the Greeks were at the end of their strength. Therefore Britain could no longer trust Greece. The Italians agreed with Mustafa Kemal and promised to withdraw all their soldiers from Antalya. Italy did not do this willingly, but it did not have the power to resist the Turkish army. France did not want to fall out with Mustafa Kemal.⁹³ After the determined behaviour of the Turkish army on the battlefield, the leaders of the Turkish National Struggle were convinced that the Greeks would be expelled from Anatolia. Meanwhile, Britain released more than thirty political prisoners held in Malta.⁹⁴

Greece was in a very disastrous financial situation in 1921–22. Due to its deteriorating economy, Greece could not receive aid from the Allied powers. The Allied states blocked the last loans they had given. This situation created a crisis of confidence between Greece and its allies. In this process, Greece did not have the power to continue the war in Anatolia economically.⁹⁵ The Turkish army gained an advantage and won the battles of First and Second İnönü followed by the successes of Sakarya and the Great Offensive.⁹⁶ After the Greek losses, Britain's attitude toward the occupation of Anatolia changed radically. Britain hoped that Greece would be able to establish its dominance, especially in İzmir and Aydın regions. However, the resistance in Anatolia was pushing Greece toward an uncertain process. Lloyd George, who had always been the main supporter of Greece, did not believe that the Greek invasion of Anatolia would be successful. Britain would no longer support Greece economically.⁹⁷

After the Battle of Sakarya, malnutrition emerged in the Greek army. In addition, the losses in the Greek army were high. There were deficiencies in the weapons and ammunition of the Greek soldiers. When rumors emerged that the Greek Army would leave Anatolia, the Hellenic Organization for the Defence of Anatolia (Mikrasia) was founded. Among those who founded this

⁹³ The United States National Archives, 867. 00/1417, (9 June 1921).

⁹⁴ The United States National Archives, 867. 00/14/2 (17 June 1921).

⁹⁵ Smith, *ibid*, p. 168.

⁹⁶ Erdem, *ibid*, p. 100.

⁹⁷ Ayşe Gülsevin Tamer, *The Greek-Turkish War of 1919-1922 in Greek Historiography: The Megali Idea in Action*, Libra Kitap, İstanbul, 2021, p. 336.

organization were the prominent Greeks of İzmir and the Metropolitan of İzmir, Hrisostomos. The aim of the organization was to organize the Greeks in Western Anatolia and establish a state in this region.⁹⁸ The Mikrasia organization attempted to prevent the capture of İzmir by the Turks. The organization requested help from the consuls of the Allied powers. The British consul stated that he would like to help, but he could not do so and that they could ask for help from the Greek army. The Mikrasia organization distributed weapons and bombs to Armenians and Greeks. When the Turkish army, led by Mustafa Kemal Atatürk, landed in İzmir, the organization threw bombs at them.⁹⁹ During this period, the local Greeks were escaping from the Greek army. Between 1921 and 1922, the number of escapees from the Greek army was approximately 20.000. The local Greeks had stopped supporting the Greek soldiers. The clergy of the Fener Greek Orthodox Church announced that those who escaped from the army would be excommunicated.¹⁰⁰ The psychological condition of the Greek soldiers was so bad that they waited for the Turkish offensive as an excuse to flee the front. Greek soldiers fleeing from their troops poured into İzmir. Incidents of theft and looting by Greek soldiers increased in İzmir. There were also hate speeches against Greek politicians among the soldiers. In this context, some soldiers said “*Let’s go and burn Athens*”.¹⁰¹ As the failures of the Greek army increased, the struggle of the Greeks in Western Anatolia turned into underground organizations. The Greek army started to disintegrate. To prevent the disintegration of the Greek army, the Greek religious authority intervened.

After the defeat in Sakarya, General Papoulas, who realized that the Greek occupation in Anatolia would not continue, resigned from his post. His successor, Georgios Hatzianestis, stayed in İzmir instead of being on the battlefield and preferred to manage the war in this way. The Turks’ army capacity was quite good. Greece, which could not get enough help from the Allied powers, announced that it would occupy İstanbul.¹⁰² Greece was aware that it could not occupy İstanbul. Greece’s main aim was to change the policies of the Allied powers. From July 1922 onwards, the Greek press began to broadcast that the army would enter İstanbul. Greek public opinion believed

⁹⁸ Erdem, *ibid*, p. 101.

⁹⁹ The United States National Archives, 767. 68116/35, (18 October 1922).

¹⁰⁰ Zafer Çakmak, “Yunanistan’ın Batı Anadolu’yu İşgali Sırasında Osmanlı Rumlarını Silâh Altına Alması”, *Belgi Dergisi*, No 13, 2017, p. 359.

¹⁰¹ Benlisoy, *ibid*, pp. 96-102.

¹⁰² Peter Kincaid Jensen, “The Greco-Turkish War, 1920-1922”, *International Journal of Middle East Studies*, Vol 10, No 4, 1979, pp. 561-562.

that this move by Greece would bring victory. Although Britain did not attach much importance to this step of Greece, it warned her. Greece transferred its troops from Anatolia to Thrace.¹⁰³ On 26 August 1922, the Turkish army attacked with artillery fire. The Greek situation worsened. The Greek troops hoped to cross to the Uşak side and take a defensive position there. The Turkish army, however, did not allow this. The line of communication between the Greek forces was broken and they were divided. On 2 September 1922, 5000 Greek soldiers approached Uşak. Yet, the Greek troops encountered the Turkish army then, they were pinned down and surrendered.¹⁰⁴

In the telegram sent by Hüseyin Rauf Orbay to the US High Commissioner on 31 August 1922, it was mentioned that the Greek army did not refrain from damaging the region during its withdrawal, and while leaving Afyonkarahisar, the Greek troops set fire to Muslim neighbourhoods and massacred the Muslim inhabitants of the villages. Women and children in the Ulucak village of Afyonkarahisar were massacred by Greek troops. During the Battle of Dumlupınar, Hamamköy and Taşköy settlements were burned down by the Greek army, and some of their inhabitants were massacred.¹⁰⁵ Greece continued its brutal policies throughout the occupation of Anatolia during its withdrawal from the war. On 9 September 1922, a unit led by Zeki Bey entered İzmir.¹⁰⁶

Afterwards, Greece's invasion of Anatolia ended in failure. For the sake of the Megali Idea, she has never stopped massacring the Muslim people in Anatolia. Even after its withdrawal, Greece continued to harm Anatolia. Having lost the confidence of the Western powers, Greece suffered financial ruin. The importance of the military and diplomatic steps of the Turkish National Struggle led by Mustafa Kemal Atatürk should be mentioned here. From the beginning of the war, the determination to oppose the Greek occupation and to act in this direction brought success to the Turkish side. The Ankara government's diplomacy with the Allied powers and the military victories on the ground complemented each other and were the basic elements of success.

¹⁰³ İsmail Ediz, *Diplomasi ve Savaş: İngiliz Belgelerinde Batı Anadolu'da Yunan İşgali*, Atatürk Araştırma Merkezi Yayınları, Ankara, 2015, pp. 312-316.

¹⁰⁴ Jensen, *ibid*, pp. 562-563.

¹⁰⁵ The United States National Archives, 867. 4016/66/255, (31 August 1922).

¹⁰⁶ Çiğdem Dumanlı, "Bir İntikam Kundakçılığı Meselesi: İzmir Yangını (1922)", *Cumhuriyet Tarihi Araştırmaları Dergisi (CTAD)*, Year 19, Issue 37, 2023, p. 563.

Conclusion

The Greek invasion of Anatolia is an important process that needs to be analyzed both militarily and diplomatically. The occupation, which began with the Greek leader Venizelos' passion for the Megali Idea, caused heavy losses in Anatolia. The systematic massacres carried out to completely erase the Turkish identity were the subject of the reports of international delegations. However, thanks to the Allied states that provided all kinds of support to Greece, Greek soldiers did not bear any sense of responsibility for the crimes they committed in Anatolia. During the occupation of İzmir, the policy of violence adopted by the Greek troops was sanctioned by the military leaders of the Allied powers. At the same time, as the Turkish National Struggle achieved military successes, the advance of Greece was halted. Thanks to the determined diplomatic behaviour, they started to develop more frequent relations with the Ankara Government.

The presentation made by Greek Prime Minister Venizelos at the Paris Peace Conference clearly intends to deceive the Allied states. The belief that Greece would be an important player in the foreign policies of the Allied states resulted in the authorization of the invasion of Anatolia. The behavior of Greek soldiers during the war has been discussed many times in international public opinion. In Venizelos' correspondence with the military or diplomatic officials of the Allied powers, the violent behavior of Greek soldiers during the occupation of Anatolia was softened. However, according to archive documents, the massacres of Greece during the occupation were aimed at the destruction of Turkish and Muslim elements in Anatolia.

The severity of Greek occupation increased with each passing year. The silence of the League of Nations and Allied powers in the face of massacres caused Greece to commit more massacres in Anatolia. The petitions written by the people of Anatolia to the League of Nations and the high commissioners of the Allied powers in order to publicize the massacres were intended to mobilize international public opinion. However, it cannot be said that these petitions had a sufficient effect. This was because for most of the war Greece had acted in line with the political interests of the Allies. For this reason, the petitions did not have sufficient impact. Moreover, the founders of the League of Nations were Allied powers. Therefore, the legitimate reactions of the Anatolian people were ignored.

The reports of international delegations visiting Anatolia and the Ankara government's communication of the massacres to its interlocutors through diplomatic channels put these issues on the international agenda. When these reports are analyzed, it is seen that Greek soldiers took advantage of local

Greeks while committing massacres. At the end of the war, it was observed that the local Greeks tried acquitting themselves by fleeing from the military.

As Greece began to decline during the war, Greek leader Venizelos requested financial aid from the Allied states. While the Allied states tried to provide this aid from the early days to the end of the war, the support given to Greece reached the point of exhaustion. Allied states realized that Greece would lose the war. With material support dwindling, the Greeks began to move out of the control of the Allied powers and, unable to hold out any longer against the advance of the Turkish army, they left Anatolia.

In a nutshell, the massacres committed by Greece in Anatolia and the military and diplomatic successes of the Ankara government have been tried to be revealed with the help of archival documents and other sources. It can be said that the Turkish National Struggle tried to use diplomatic means effectively to publicize the Greek massacre in Anatolia. There were differences between the motivations of the Greeks to invade Anatolia and the justifications they put forward at the Paris Peace Conference. The Greek side could not achieve success in Anatolia despite the help of the Western States

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